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Mr. Attlee: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to bear in mind that those who advocate a Ministry of Supply do not accept for a moment the idea that it must have compulsory powers?
The Prime Minister: I said that it must involve compulsory powers if it was to produce an appreciable effect. If the right hon. Gentleman does not accept that, perhaps he will say, when he again intervenes in the Debate, in what way it will produce an appreciable effect without compulsory powers. I have never yet been able to discover how it can be done. Generally, on the military side we have not yet completed the consideration of the review which we have made, but, as I stated in answer to a question, there will be an opportunity in the new Session of Parliament to have a full debate on this subject. I would like, however, to make two general observations on the subject now. The first is this. I want hon. Members to remember that our pro- gramme of rearmament is a five-year pro- gramme, and we are now only in the third year of that programme. To argue that because everything had not been com- pleted in the third year the programme had broken down is to lose sight altogether of the fact that it was never intended to be completed in three years. I doubt whether it would have been pos- sible, of we had endeavoured to do so at the beginning of the programme, to squeeze a five-year programme into three years. But, to conclude, our review does bring up the special urgency of certain parts of that programme and the neces- sity for reinforcement of certain weak spots, which, if they were allowed to con- tinue, might jeopardise the effectiveness of the whole system which we have built up. Therefore, we have to address our- selves to this point. The measures which it will be necessary to take will un- doubtedly add to the total cost of arma- ments as we had hitherto contemplated.
That brings me to my second observa- tion, which concerns the use which is to be made of these armaments. I tried on 5th October to give as clear an ex- position as I could of the Government's policy; but I regret to observe that since then doubts have been expressed in some quarters, both at home and abroad, as to whether this review, this bringing up to standard of the scale of our arma- ments, is consistent with the peaceful pro- fessions which we are expressing at the
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same time. I do not know why any different standards should be applied to this country and to other countries in that respect. But I do repeat here categorically what I have so often said, that we have no aggressive intentions against Germany or any other country. Our sole concern is to see that this country and her Imperial communications are safe, and that we shall not be so weak relatively with other countries that our diplomacy cannot enter upon discussions upon an equal footing. There is nothing further from our minds than entry upon a new armaments race.
In talking about the Munich results, it seems to me that the right hon. Gentle- man forgot the last act at Munich, which, after all, is not the least important one. That declaration which was signed by Herr Hitler and myself, and in which we recorded our belief in the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again, and expressed our own intention that the method of consultation should be the method adopted to deal with other questions which might concern us, and our intention also to continue our efforts to
remove every possible source of difference that declaration signed by us seems to have dropped out of sight lately. I myself feel that in that declaration, if it is properly and suitably followed up, lies the chance of a new era of peace in Europe. When I signed that document I meant what was in the docu- ment.
I am convinced that Herr Hitler meant it too when he signed it; and I am equally convinced that those views are the views of the majority of the people both in Germany and in this country. Let there be no mistake, let there be no doubts as to our policy and our inten- tions; as to the desire, the firm deter- mination, that there shall be no sitting still and waiting for peace to come, but that we must take firm and practical steps towards that end. The right hon. Gentleman asked whether we were to wait always until war threatened before we thought the time was ripe for dis- cussion. No Sir. That is the whole point of the policy which we are pursuing, that we should not wait. Too often delays have taken place in the past. We should not wait until a crisis becomes acute before we try to settle it, but we should try to consolidate the good will of the four Powers when they assembled at Munich, and we should endeavour to
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International Situation I NOVEMBER 1938 restore European confidence by the re- moval of fears and suspicions.
The ultimate aim of this Government, as I believe it must be the ultimate aim of every Government, whatever its com- plexion may be, is the improvement of the standard of living of the people. It is difficult to reconcile that with the con- tinued piling up of armaments. We should always have that in mind. What we are aiming at is, first, the limitation of armaments by agreement-for unilateral disarmament will help nobody and, in the end, the practical abolition. That is looking very far ahead: I shall not see it; but I do not see why we should not get the first stages of it if we pursue a con- sistent and persistent policy. We shall never get far unless we can accustom our- selves to the idea that the democracies and the totalitarian States are not to be ranged against one another in two oppos- ing blocs, but that they can, if they choose, work together not merely for the settlement of differences after they have arisen, but also for the operation of a constructive programme, a programme which will facilitate the international exchange of goods and the regulation of international relations in various ways for the good of all. That is the policy which is sometimes called the policy of appease- ment. That is the policy to which this Government intends wholeheartedly to devote itself.
5.42 p.m.
Sir A. Sinclair: The situation is so serious, and the need for finding the greatest possible measure of national unity is so urgent, that I do not want to spend much time on the past in the observations which I am going to make to the House this evening, but there are one or two things that the Prime Minister said about what has happened in the recent past to which I must refer. First of all, I want to refer to the arguments which he used to justify the use of the 1910 census as the basis for the drawing of the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. When it was agreed that whatever territories contained
50 per cent. of German- speaking population were to be returned to Germany, it was a clear and plain defiance of the principle of self-determi- nation, even if the figures taken had been those of a recent election, because it is quite clear that of the 49 per cent. of Czechs all would have been in favour of
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remaining in Czechoslovakia, and of the 50 and odd per cent. of Germans a sub- stantial minority would have been in favour of remaining in Czechoslovakia- Jews, Democrats, trade unionists, Social- ists, all of whom had every reason to view with horror the prospect of passing under the Nazi régime.
To adopt the 1910 census, taken 28 years ago, a generation ago, was to reduce the whole scheme to absurdity. And, indeed, everybody knows that the 1910 census was taken by the officials of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in a most ruthless and unscrupulous way. It is well known that prominent Englishmen who were living in Austria at the time and were able to speak German, were asked whether they were able to speak German and written down as German-speaking inhabitants of that country. But self- determination, if it has any real meaning at all, means ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants. It must be based upon the wishes of the inhabitants, and the basis of the solution which the Prime Minister agreed to adopt was not self- determination at all. It was merely the racial theory of the Nazis that wherever there are 50 per cent. or more of the German race that population must come under the rule of the German Govern- ment. But that is not self-determination.
The Prime Minister referred to the optants. He said that, under the scheme which was going to be approved by the International Commission in Berlin, men and women who were brought now within the frontiers of the Reich, would have the option of going out of the Reich and coming into Czechoslovakia if they pleased. If, as I understand, the Presi- dent of the Board of Trade is to reply to this Debate, I will put to him this question. Will an effort be made to offer this option to people who are now in concentration camps; people who have been taken hold of and put there to be kept, as Herr Hen- lein said, until they turned black? Will they be given the option of leaving the concentration camps and going into Czechoslovakia if they wish? I would like a definite answer to that question.
Then about the refugees. The Prime Minister said that of those whose lives were directly threatened if they returned to Germany, we had offered asylum to 350. I understand that there are alto- gether about 30,000 to 50,000 German refugees whose lives or liberties are in
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